Article 19 explains the voidability of contracts without free consent. The first exception to this article is that if a party has accepted the terms of the contract through silence or misrepresentation, the contract would not be voidable if the party had been able to discover the truth through ordinary care. In this case, the silence or misrepresentation must be part of the fraud referred to in § 17. Fraud involves and includes any of the following acts committed by either party or its tacit acquiescence or representative with intent to deceive or induce another party or its representative to enter into the Agreement. Under article 447, a person convicted of fraud may be punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 10 years. It is also liable to fines of up to three times the amount of the fraud in question. If the circumstances of the fraud are contrary to the public interest, the offender may be punished by imprisonment for at least three years. According to the definition of fraud in section 17, the circumstances that constitute fraud are as follows: Each party to a prenuptial agreement is required to disclose all material facts. If the exact facts are not disclosed, the other party may terminate the order and revoke the contract. In Anurag Anand v. Sunita Anand (1996), caste, income, age, nationality, religion, education, marital status, marital status and financial status must be considered as essential facts and circumstances.
The defendant must be informed immediately of his obligation to keep all relevant documents relating to the case, in particular all electronically stored information. This electronic data could take the form of texts and conversations shared with the applicant. The court explained the difference between a contract obtained by fraud and the performance of a contract (which is perfectly valid) that is affected by fraud or fraud, stating that the latter would not fall within the scope of section 17 of the Contracts Act, in which the remedy for damages would be available, but not the remedy to treat the contract itself as void. For this reason, the words “with the intention of deceiving another party or his representative” should be read together with the words “or induce him to conclude the contract”, both expressions referring to the conclusion of the contract itself. This is also clear from Articles 10, 14 and 19, all of which deal with “fraud” at the contract stage. Even Article 17(5), which refers to `such an act or omission which the law specifically classifies as fraudulent`, must cover such an act or omission within the meaning of that law at the stage of conclusion of the contract. Therefore, mere silence on certain essential facts affecting an individual`s intention to conclude the contract does not constitute fraud. But if their silence can be treated as speech, or if the person is obliged to inform the other party of the facts, silence would amount to fraud. Mere silence can lead to fraud because one party fails to disclose relevant facts and causes harm to the other party.
If a contract is concluded by fraud, the agent is entitled to claim withdrawal or damages, or both. He would have remedied by such an action, even if restitutio in integrum is not possible, as in Indranath Banerjee v. Rooke. In Firbank`s Executors v. Humphreys, damages for fraudulent misrepresentation were determined in accordance with the general rule, taking into account the difference between the situation in which the plaintiff would have found himself if the statement had been true and the situation in which he actually finds himself by reason of its truthfulness. Sometimes a representation is authentic when made, but it could be falsified due to different conditions if it is sued by the other party. In such conditions, it is the duty of the person who made the representation to communicate the difference in the conditions. In one English case, a clinical specialist told the offended party that his training was worth £2000 a year. At the time of the declaration, he had given the correct value of the practice. However, five months later, when the applicant purchased the training, it was almost worthless.