Imagine that you are the leader of an activist group. Your enemy is a government that is much stronger than your crew. How can you overcome opportunities and achieve your political goals? For more than a decade, the author has studied hundreds of activist groups in world history to see why some succeed while others are doomed to failure. This book offers good news for the rebel. It turns out that the leaders of militant groups have surprising freedom to decide their political fate. Triumph is possible. But only for those who know what to do. It is the first book to identify a coherent series of actions that can enable activist leaders to win. Discover the secrets of their success. Successful activists follow three simple rules based on original ideas from many disciplines (communication, criminology, economics, history, management, marketing, political science, psychology, sociology) and methodology (qualitative case studies, content analysis, network analysis, regression analysis, experiments). There is a science to victory in the history of the world. But the rebels must also follow rules. The first rule for the rebels is to avoid attacks on civilians.
As previous chapters have shown, terrorism harms the cause by reducing the chances of concessions and survival. There are considerable differences in the tactical IQ of militant leaders. Smart leaders understand the cost of terrorism, or at least learn it over time from their own experiences or those of others. In contrast, stupid terrorist leaders like the Armed Islamic Group, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the Islamic State never learn the value of tactical restraint. These groups pay a high price for having ignorant leaders. This chapter shows that leadership is important for militant groups to use violence productively. With the death of the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in October 2019, the world, and Western governments in particular, celebrated their victory over one of the most notorious militant groups of modern times. The President of the United States proclaimed: “He died like a dog.
He died like a coward. The world is a much safer place now. While it is doubtful that the world is now a much safer place, an obvious and frequent question arises as to whether this means the end of ISIS and its terrorist activities. To answer this question, it would be useful to ask how we can position Daesh as a rebel group: success or failure. This book by Max Abrahms is an important contribution to answering this question. Setting the context for the book`s investigation, which emerged during the author`s field visit to the West Bank, the book begins with the riddle: despite the common opinion among scholars that terrorism can be an effective tool for achieving political goals, why is Palestinian terrorism not considered a success by Israelis and Palestinians? By strictly limiting the definition of terrorism to attacks on civilians, the author opposes what he calls the “strategic model of terrorism”. According to this model, acts of terrorism are seen as a strategic tool to achieve the political objectives of a rebel group. On the contrary, Abrahms argues that terrorism cannot be an effective tool for rebel groups. Instead, he outlines three rules for rebels to succeed (without using terrorism): “learn to win,” “hold back to win,” and “score to win.” 7Essentially, from the political successes and failures of militant groups, the author has developed a theoretical framework that identifies potential political successes based on extensive statistical analysis. The author argues that the success of a militant group`s political agenda depends on the tactical intelligence of its leaders.
For a militant group to successfully advance its agenda, its leaders must follow the three main rules for rebels: 1) recognize that not all violence is the same, 2) deter subordinate members from committing acts of terrorism, and 3) keep the organization away from terrorist acts committed by its members targeting civilians. Failure to comply with any of these rules will result in the group`s actions failing, even if the public, as represented by the media, may see it differently. What sets the book apart is its multidisciplinary approach, the appropriate use of mixed-methods research, and most importantly, a very pragmatic set of three rules for understanding rebel groups. The book is multidisciplinary in that it draws on cognitive psychology, communication theory, and organizational theory to understand terrorism. For example, while the second part of the book is primarily based on organizational theory, the third part of the book uses theories from communication, marketing, and psychology. Throughout the book, the author uses quantitative and qualitative methods to support his arguments. Statistical analyses, personal interviews and observations are widely used to arrive at the results. Therefore, it is safe to say that these three rules are suitable for calibrating whether a rebel group will be a success or a failure.
11In developing the three rules for rebels, Abrahms proposes a new way of working with militant groups by changing the public`s misunderstanding of terrorism and promoting greater engagement with the international community to reduce incitement to terrorism. Rules for Rebels challenges assumptions in the political literature and social sciences by providing a blueprint of the determinants that are crucial for militant groups to achieve political success. By analyzing the internal organizational determinants of militant groups` actions, the book offers an alternative perspective on how to manage them successfully. Max Abrahms` book offers important insights into the impact of terrorism and militant groups on modern society and makes a unique contribution to the discipline of political science. In short, rules for rebels are not something terrorism scientists and policymakers can ignore. Moreover, as the author rightly notes, this book is just as relevant to rebel groups. The book seems to have become more important today than when it was published in 2018. The lessons learned from these three rules will enable decision-makers to gain a thorough understanding of the internal and external factors that influence the success of rebel groups. This will enable decision-makers to develop appropriate measures to address these issues.
And for rebel groups, these rules can be guiding principles for effectively achieving their political goals without resorting to terrorist activities. Returning to the question of the impact of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi`s death on ISIS and its terrorist activities, the book leads us to conclude that it will not make much difference to ISIS members and their terrorist activities, as the group violates these three rules. (In fact, this is Abrahms` most recent view on the subject.) That is, at first, Daesh did not learn to avoid attacks on civilians; Thousands of people from Syria and Iraq have been ruthlessly attacked.