Chapter III.3 is divided into Parts A and B, “Women and Lending in Athenian Society: A Horos Re-examined” and “Notes on a Horos of the Athenian Agora” (originally published with Kenneth Tuite). These return to epigraphic evidence of loan, but this time to take stock of the economic activities of Athenian women. In Athens, there was a law that prohibited women from participating in transactions involving more than one small sum (specifically, a Medimnus barley). However, H makes a compelling argument that women could be involved in much larger loans if they worked with a man who would receive the guarantee. After describing this method, H turns to the summary of the chapters and explains the topics that connect them. In discussing these connections, he also explains how the chapters support parts of his overarching view of Athenian democracy, which looks like this: The Athenians equated democracy with the rule of law, as opposed to the sovereignty of the people.4 Their laws and government were considered the common property of all citizens and were intended to serve the common good. The rule of law was the opposite of tyranny (government one side, one side). The Athenian laws that regulated the economy were sophisticated enough to support complex economic activities, although they lacked important concepts such as enterprise. The average Athenian had at least a basic knowledge of law and the legal system and took his duties as legislators and judges seriously. Litigants in the Athens trials assumed that the court was trying to apply the laws impartially and viewed unfavorably those who used the law to pursue personal quarrels. Despite the progressive aspects of democracy, women and slaves were treated deplorably in Athenian law. I say that the chapters “support” parts of this view because H points out that the book is not an attempt to justify all these positions in detail (hence the subtitle: “Essays on…” »). Nevertheless, I found it very useful to situate the individual studies both in broader debates and in the coherent – albeit controversial – positions of H.
Chapter I.3, “Antigone the Advocate or the Ambiguities of Nomos” is one of the longest pieces in the book. He addresses Antigone`s debate with Creon through the analysis of the Athenian concept of Nomos. From the Athenian point of view, an ordinary law is supported both by the will of the gods and by the consent of the community. H believes that public sympathies would be with Antigone practically from the beginning; When Antigone buries her brother, she is not violating a true law of the polis, but only the decree (kerygma) of a tyrant. H`s argument about the meaning of nomos shows that the opposition that influences so many modern readings of the play, i.e. the laws of the polis against the laws of the gods, would be a false dichotomy for the audience. Yet I was not convinced by his view of public sympathy. He is right when he asserts that Creon governs undemocratically and perhaps even seems undemocratic in the famous “ship of the state” speech (pp. 69-73).
But the public had to give Creon some leeway to be king; the play is finally set in the mythology of Thebes. On the other hand, they would probably view Antigone`s behavior, at least at the opening, as subversive, both by the standards of their world and by their own. This book aims to show how the Athenians tried to put into practice the ideal of the rule of law and to understand the nature of the dispute in their democratic context. Recent books on Athenian courts have focused primarily on Athenian social values, but they have paid less attention to the political ideal of the rule of law and the procedures followed by Athenians to implement this ideal. This study goes beyond the study of rhetoric and ideology and examines how the law has worked in action, both in the community as a whole and in the courts. One of the key issues is the importance of paying close attention to the exact characteristics of court proceedings in order to understand how litigants behave in everyday life and have presented their arguments in court. The book is divided into three parts. The first part analyses the political and social contexts of Athenian law. The second part examines how the Athenians applied the law in their courts. The third part deals with the breakdown of the rule of law.
Chapter I.1, “Solon and the Spirit of Greek Law”, contrasts the attitude towards law shown in Solon`s poems and early inscriptions with the views found in the legal systems of the Near East (Hammurabi and Lipit-Ishtar): While law in the Middle East seems to emanate from an absolute ruler, in Greece it is described as a common property of citizens. Chapter I.2, “Pericles` Praise of Athenian Democracy,” argues that the ambivalence toward democracy noted by many readers of the funeral oration is based on a misinterpretation of Thucydides 2:37, the purpose of which is not to contrast “the democratic façade of the Athenian government with its aristocratic reality” (p. 34), but to contrast Athenian democracy with the Spartan oligarchy. 5. See “Law and public speaking” (No. 2); for a contrary view, see D. Cohen, Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge 1995). Society members can access a journal in one of the following ways: Use your phone`s camera – scan the code below and download the Kindle app. A personal account can be used to receive email notifications, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions. 6.
See A. Riggsby, “Did the Romans Believe in Their Judgments?” Rhetorica 15.3 (1997) 235-52. His suggestion is essentially that the Romans had roughly the same idea of a process as we do; They just had radically different ideas about the evidence. Criticism aside, this is a useful book. At $85, I`m not sure I`d buy it for myself. But it belongs to all university libraries and, above all, to the reserve shelf for seminars on Greek law and Greek history. The second part, “Law and Economics,” begins with a general introduction to these topics, coupled with a case study, “Law and Economics in Classical Athens: [Demosthenes] vs. Dionysidorus.” This chapter aims and largely succeeds in being quite general for students or non-classicals. 2.
In particular: “Law and oratory”, in I. Worthington, ed., Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action (London 1994), pp. 130-50; Open Texture in Athenian Law”, DIKE 3 (2000) 29-79; and “Feuding or the Rule of Law?” in M. Gagarin and R. Wallace, eds., Symposion 2001: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Cologne and Vienna 2005), pp. 125-41. H suggests in the preface (p. ix) that he intends to use these and other essays as the basis for a book on Athenian litigation and the interpretation of laws. Download the free Kindle app and instantly read Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer, no Kindle device required. More information. Learn more about this | seller Contact seller This title is available as an eBook.
To buy, visit your favorite e-book provider. Available in Oxford Scholarship Online – View abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. {{shippingLabel}} {{#showShipPrice}} {{bestListingForDislay.shippingToDestinationPriceInPurchaseCurrencyWithCurrencySymbol}} {{#showSurferCurrency}} ({{bestListingForDislay.shippingToDestinationPriceInSurferCurrencyWithCurrencySymbol}}) {{/showSurferCurrency}} {{/showShipPrice}} {{#showFreeShipping}} {{freeshipping}} {{/showFreeShipping}} {{shippingText}} But the absence of definitions in Athenian laws does not mean that their terms were not defined in the minds of litigants and judges. H suggests that the substance of Athenian laws can be restored by “philological analysis of key terms in laws” and “awareness of legal questions” (p. xvii). By examining the content of Athenian laws, H. wants to “show that the Athenians were more demanding in legal matters than many supposed” (ibid.). He does not argue that Athenian law was as sophisticated as Roman law, and he notes that several of the essays contain warnings against importing anachronistic concepts. But he also argues that careful analogies with Roman and other legal systems can serve a heuristic function. Comparisons generate hypotheses that can be tested using Athenian evidence.
In some cases, the content of an Athenian law is explained by similar provisions in Roman law; In others, it is illuminated by contrasts. The third part, “Law and Family,” begins with two studies on rape in Athenian law. In III.1, H dissects a notorious argument from Lysias 1: Since the legislature allows a husband to kill adultery caught red-handed, but cites fines for violent sexual relations with a wife, child or concubine, seduction is obviously the most serious crime. This is not the case, H: Lysias does not mention that a man caught having sex with someone else`s wife, whether by seduction or violence, could be killed by the husband.